Asya Beyza Şahin / asyabeyzasahin@gmail.com - ORCID: 0009-002-4924-4893

Abstract

This study examines how sustained counterterrorism pressure, within a framework of sustainable security, reshapes the target selection dynamics of terrorist organizations. Based on 62,842 global terrorist incidents coded by the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (2018–2025) and a case study encompassing 378 incidents centered in Türkiye between 2014 and 2025, the paper offers a comparative assessment of targeting patterns under varying levels of operational constraints. While current academic work largely conceptualizes counterterrorism effectiveness in terms of tactical success or post-attack response, this study identifies sustainability and civilian casualty reduction as key analytical indicators of strategic security. The findings demonstrate that prolonged military and security pressure is associated with a measurable narrowing of target diversity and a shift from attacks resulting in mass casualties to more symbolic and lower-impact targets. The Turkish example illustrates how cross-border operations and intelligence-driven counterterrorism practices relate to a decrease in civilian casualty rates and a shift in the target-selection behavior of organizations after 2017. This article contributes to terrorism studies by integrating global event data with a focused regional sample, linking target selection dynamics to sustainability-oriented counterterrorism outcomes.

Keywords: Sustainable Counterterrorism, Target Selection Dynamics, Non-State Armed Actors, Cross-Border Military Operations,Strategic Security

Introduction

The defining characteristic of the modern state, in Max Weber's classic definition, is its monopoly on legitimate violence. This monopoly imposes on the state the obligation to maintain social order and ensure the security of its citizens, while also granting it the authority to instrumentalize violence in the face of threats to itself or its regime (Weber, 1919/1946). Non-state illegal actors, particularly terrorist organizations, systematically use violence and fear to achieve their political goals. This situation highlights the methodological and normative similarities between the state's monopoly on violence and the violence of terrorist organizations; it also makes the distinction between the concepts of "counter-terrorism" and "combating terrorism" critical. Leading researchers in the literature (Schmid, 2011; Hoffman, 2006; Crenshaw, 2010) clearly distinguish these two concepts: Counter-terrorism focuses on the ideological, political, social, and organizational root causes that give rise to terrorism; Counter-terrorism refers to the physical neutralization of terrorist actors through direct military, police, and intelligence operations. However, in Türkiye, official discourse and legislation generally focus on "combating terrorism." In this context, Türkiye has adopted a hybrid security doctrine combining these two layers in the post-2014 period. The process extending from the 2015-2016 Hendek incidents to the cross-border Claw series of operations represents a new operational tempo focused on UAV/UAS integration and intelligence. However, the extent to which tactical successes (number of terrorists neutralized, etc.) translate into sustainable strategic security is a subject of academic debate. This study reconceptualizes success in two dimensions:

1. Sustainability: Defined as a decrease in the number of actions carried out and civilian casualties/injuries, and a long-term weakening in indicators of operational continuity.

2. Security: Defined as the absence of civilian casualties and the minimization of civilian injuries in terrorist acts.

This article argues that sustained counterterrorism pressure leads to a measurable contraction in terrorist organizations’ target diversity and a shift from mass-casualty violence toward more symbolic forms of attack. By operationalizing sustainability through civilian harm reduction and organizational continuity, the study reframes counterterrorism effectiveness beyond tactical success.

I. Terrorism and the Fight Against Terrorism/Terrorists

The concept of terror, which entered the Turkish language by deriving from the Latin word "terrere," meaning to frighten, intimidate, frighten, or subdue (Başeren, 2008), is defined in the Turkish Language Association Dictionary as "intimidation, killing, destroying property, frightening, terrorizing." Terrorism, on the other hand, is defined as an action or threat designed to influence the government or intimidate the public; it uses methods of violence and fear for a political, religious, or ideological purpose. In the Great Larousse encyclopedia, the concept of terror is defined as "The systematic use of violence, intimidation, terrorizing in order to force a power or authority upon someone." In the Le Petit Robert dictionary, terror is defined as "The common fear created by a group in a society to break the resistance of the people" (Kemik, 2021). Terrorism is the calculated use of violence to create a climate of fear in a society and thus achieve a specific political goal. In this context, Interpol considers terrorism as a multi-dimensional and complex concept encompassing a range of threats, from organized conflict zone terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters to individual radicalized perpetrators (lone wolves) and attacks carried out with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials.

Today, the concept of terrorism is no longer limited to traditional methods of attack (hostage-taking, explosive devices, sabotage, etc.); with the increased accessibility of non-state armed actors to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials, terrorism has become a much more complex phenomenon. The use of chemical materials as operational tools by terrorist organizations in conflict zones, particularly in Syria and Iraq, demonstrates that CBRN elements have moved from a theoretical threat to a practical one. This situation, combined with the return of foreign terrorist fighters, raises concerns that this knowledge and experience could be transferred to third countries. As McLeish emphasizes, the increasing normalization of the use of chemical weapons in conflict zones and the adoption of this practice by non-state actors forces a questioning of traditional assumptions about the nature of terrorism and necessitates a rethinking of security policies (McLeish, 2017). In this context, CBRN-based attacks are used as a strategic tool by terrorist organizations due to their potential to cause physical destruction and their capacity to create social panic.

Indeed, the lack of a universal definition of terrorism directly affects the methods states use to combat it. Each state attempts to prevent radicalization through specific laws developed within its domestic legal system and pursues counter-terrorism policies. For example, the United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as the use or threat of certain actions, such as violence, property damage, endangering life, jeopardizing security, or interfering with electronic systems, designed to intimidate the government or the public with the intention of advancing a political, religious, racial, or ideological aim (Özkan & Demirci, 2021). In this context, counter-terrorism and combating violent extremism are methods that governments and organizations employ to stop terrorism or prevent people from becoming terrorists. According to Bilgiç (2014), counter-terrorism should be conducted with a "multidimensional approach encompassing soft and hard power areas such as education, economy, health, social, socio-cultural, socio-psychological, communication, administration, diplomacy, security, and similar fields."

A counter-terrorism strategy limited solely to military operations is insufficient for achieving a sustainable peace. States need to pursue a more effective counter-terrorism strategy with a collective awareness among state institutions and society. However, the process of building and accepting this understanding of counter-terrorism within society may not be easy. When states want to pursue a collective counter-terrorism policy, they may face strong public opposition and this type of policy may not be supported. Therefore, public expectations have a significant impact on shaping governments' counter-terrorism policies.

II. Target Selection in Terrorist Organizations

Terrorist organizations, in order to achieve their political goals, may choose more symbolic targets to effectively manage the organization's material and moral resources. In this context, terrorists tend to choose to attack targets that provide the greatest benefit to their aims (Çardak, 2022). “Infrastructure systems in city centers offer terrorists opportunities for sabotage, disrupting daily activities, and weakening government forces at a relatively low cost” (Kurum, 2023). Given that actions carried out in city centers provide terrorist organizations with high visibility, urban areas, with their politically symbolic characteristics, are among the priority targets for terrorist organizations. In this context, Graph 1 below visualizes the target selection data in global terrorist incidents between 2018 and 2025, prepared by the Global Terrorism Index GGTAC based on 62,825 cases.

Source: Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GGTAC). https://data.ggtac.com Accessed Date (31.12.2025).

As shown in Graph 1, out of 62,825 cases worldwide, 16,649 terrorist attacks targeted facilities and critical infrastructure, while 8,015 targeted private property. The concept of critical infrastructure has gained importance, particularly in the modern era where terrorist acts have increased in intensity and aggressiveness; in this process, states and executive bodies have begun to develop policies aimed at protecting this infrastructure. Critical infrastructure facilities, which play a central role in political, economic, social, and cultural development, are among the main targets of international terrorist organizations today.

The distribution of target selection for 382 terrorist acts carried out by terrorist organizations directly targeting Türkiye between 2018 and 2025 is given below.

Source: Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GGTAC). https://data.ggtac.com Accessed Date (31.12.2025).

Since 2018, 191 of the terrorist acts that have taken place in Türkiye have targeted critical infrastructure and facilities. In particular, the PKK terrorist organization has been observed to target critical facilities and infrastructure, carrying out multi-faceted attacks ranging from rural to urban areas since the 1980s. In this context, the PKK's target choices and numerical distribution following the 2014 peace process are presented more comprehensively in Graph 3, based on 378 cases.

Source: Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GGTAC). https://data.ggtac.com Accessed Date (31.12.2025).

In Graph 3, based on data compiled from 378 actions between 2014-2025, the actions carried out by the PKK terrorist organization are categorized as critical facilities/infrastructure, residential areas, land transportation, public spaces, state institutions, and military targets. In the actions carried out by the PKK between 2014-2025, critical infrastructure and facilities stand out with 206 actions; the second main target type is civilian living areas with 85 actions. Among the actions carried out by the PKK to date are "raids on districts, villages and hamlets, bomb attacks, suicide attacks, sabotage, raids, kidnappings, roadblocks, mine laying and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), attacks on military units and police stations, infiltration and harassment, and numerous other methods" (İşeri, 2008, cited by Cantenar and Tümlü, 2016).

Below, Table 1 lists the following events under the category "Some of the civilian massacres by PKK/YPG-PYD between 1987-2022" in the institutional publication titled "Türkiye's Fight Against Terrorism" published by the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye's Communications Directorate in 2023.

 Table 1. Türkiye's Fight Against Terrorism" published by the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye's Communications Directorate in 2023

Rather than treating these figures as indicators of tactical success, this study uses them to contextualize shifts in civilian casualty ratios and organizational targeting behavior. Considering the data in Graph 3 and Table 1, it is seen that terrorist organizations targeting Türkiye mostly target civilians and public areas. Data shared between 1987 and 2022 shows that mass killings increased in Türkiye in 2016 and 2017 following the 2014 peace process. Although attacks continued after Türkiye's border operations, a decrease in civilian deaths has been observed since 2018. Graph 4 below shows the types of attacks carried out by the PKK/KCK terrorist organization in rural and urban areas between 1984 and 2022.

The action strategies of terrorist organizations are constantly adapting and evolving in parallel with the countermeasures of security forces and technological developments. According to the data in Graph 4, the PKK/KCK terrorist organization carried out 21,753 armed attacks in urban centers and rural areas within 38 years. While in the past, terrorist acts were generally carried out using high-risk methods requiring direct contact or relying on conventional weapons, such as armed clashes, mines/IEDs, and suicide attacks; with the adaptation that emerges as the "learning organizations" approach, terrorist organizations have developed more complex methods today with the aim of minimizing their operational risks and increasing their visibility. The most important reflection of this transformation is the use of drones. By identifying security vulnerabilities in military technological systems, terrorist organizations; The adaptation of these technologies to their own tactical attacks and their transformation and use is one of the most distinctive features of new-generation terrorism (Balkan, 2019). The PKK terrorist organization began using technological tools such as drones, model aircraft, and mock planes in its terrorist acts from 2016 onwards; this method has gradually gained a significant place in the organization's range of actions (Bural, 2021). In other words, while terrorist organizations were using rotary-wing drones in 2016, it has been observed that they have recently been using fixed-wing, glider-type platforms (Kasapoğlu & Kırdemir, 2019). This change in both target selection and weapon use by terrorist organizations throughout history has a significant impact on their motivation and sustainability. The cross-border operations launched by Türkiye to protect its border security are presented in categories such as seized ammunition, killed terrorists, and destroyed caves. Furthermore, the operation is analyzed through the repaired schools, mosques, and churches since its inception.

Graph 5 below shows the cross-border operations carried out by Türkiye against the PKK/KCK terrorist organizations between 2019 and 2022.

The terrorist organizations targeting Türkiye are not limited to the PKK. Given the nature of its actions and the violence it inflicts on civilians, the ISIS terrorist organization is also a non-state armed actor threatening Türkiye's national security. Türkiye has simultaneously conducted various operations against both of these terrorist organizations. Below, Graph 5 shows the operations against ISIS between 2018 and 2022.

Graph 5 shows that in the operations carried out by Türkiye within the scope of its fight against the PKK; as a result of Operation Pençe, which lasted 57 days, 6,370 terrorists were neutralized. As a result of Operation Barış Pınarı, which was launched on October 9, 2019, 464 schools were repaired and reopened for education; 87 mosques and 7 churches were maintained and repaired; and 605 terrorists were neutralized (Ministry of National Defense, 2025). In the Bahar Kalkanı Operation, conducted on February 10, 2020, within the framework of the right of self-defense stipulated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Turkish Armed Forces neutralized 3,473 regime elements, 3 aircraft, 8 helicopters, 1 UAV, 93 tanks, 36 armored vehicles, 67 howitzers/multiple rocket launchers, and 10 air defense systems. Furthermore, between 2019 and 2022, the Pençe-1, Pençe-2, Pençe-3, Pençe-Kaplan, Pençe-Şimşek, Pençe-Yıldırım, and Pençe Kilit operations were conducted. To date, in the Pençe series, 1,709 terrorists have been neutralized; 3,415 weapons and 1,391,000 rounds of ammunition have been seized; and 2,486 caves/shelters and 5,022 improvised explosive devices/mines have been destroyed. Graph 6 shows that Türkiye has conducted a total of 7,698 operations against ISIS; between 2014 and 2022, a total of 3,564 detentions and 1,083 arrests were made (Presidential Communications Directorate, 2023).

Discussion

Each state's methods of perceiving terrorism and developing counter-strategies; that is, its counter-terrorism policies, differ. The data and tables shared above show that while terrorist organizations targeting Türkiye directly targeted civilians in 2016-2017, a significant decrease in mass civilian casualties has been observed between 2018 and the present day following operations conducted within the framework of counter-terrorism strategies. In this research process, a comparison of GTTAC's data on global terrorist acts and the target distribution of terrorist acts in Türkiye after 2014 reveals that terrorist organizations directly target critical infrastructure and facilities. It has been observed that after critical infrastructure, terrorist organizations target residential areas; that is, civilians, in both global and Turkish terrorist acts. In this context, a tactical shift in the PKK's types and methods of action has been observed since 2014, along with its adaptation to the developing military technological systems.

According to PKK attack statistics from 1984-2022, a total of 14,733 people lost their lives, including 5,923 soldiers, 671 police personnel, 1,555 security guards, 556 public officials, and 6,028 civilians (Presidential Communications Directorate, 2023). The increase in the number of attacks carried out by the PKK in city centers and villages since the 1980s, and the resulting casualty rates, contrasted with the decrease observed in these indicators after 2017, points to the potential of Türkiye's counter-terrorism strategies to create a relatively more sustainable security environment in terms of societal costs. Within this framework, the question of whether terrorism is a truly existing threat is a significant outcome in demonstrating the sustainability of states' counter-terrorism strategies through the use of violence. While the PKK increasingly targeted villages and civilians in its target selections after 2014, it would not be wrong to say that the organization's resources were weakened by the ammunition seized/destroyed in Türkiye's counter-terrorism operations. However, learning organizations and adaptation processes, as well as factors such as the financing of terrorism, can contribute to the organization regaining its former potential over time. Suicide attacks are a significant indicator of the reflection of religious motivation in violent practices. In addition, the organizations' shift towards the use of UAVs within the scope of technological adaptation processes is emerging as a development that reshapes states' security perceptions. With the cross-border operations carried out by Türkiye in 2017 under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, civilian casualty rates decreased in the period after 2017. It has been observed that the target selections in the actions carried out after 2017 were more symbolic (e.g., Tusaş Attack 2024, Ministry of Interior Attack, 2023).

In this study, the concept of sustainability is considered as the reduction of civilian casualties in terrorist acts occurring within the borders of Türkiye; Between 2015-2016-2017, there was a numerical increase in terrorist acts and the direct targeting of civilians in public spaces; after 2017, Türkiye's cross-border operations weakened the organization's dynamics, and from 2017 to the present, there has been a significant decrease in the rate of civilian casualties and the number of attacks carried out by the PKK terrorist organization.

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that sustained counterterrorism pressure is associated with a measurable narrowing of the target diversity of terrorist organizations and a shift from violence leading to mass casualties to more symbolic forms of attack. The paper extends counterterrorism effectiveness beyond short-term tactical success by functionalizing sustainability through reductions in civilian casualties and changes in target selection behavior, highlighting the strategic importance of organizational adaptation. The Turkish case, as an illustrative example of these dynamics, shows how long-term military and intelligence-driven counterterrorism practices have coincided with declining civilian casualty rates and changing target selection patterns since 2017. Rather than presenting Türkiye as an exceptional case, the findings offer broader implications for understanding how non-state armed actors readjust their operational strategies under sustained pressure. Several limitations must be acknowledged. First, the analysis relies on event-based datasets that may underreport specific event types and fail to fully capture organizational decision-making processes. Second, while the Turkish case provides detailed empirical information, future research should expand this framework to additional regional contexts to assess the generalizability of the proposed sustainability indicators. Future studies could also examine how emerging technologies, including unmanned systems and cyber capabilities, are reshaping terrorist targeting strategies and how urban environments influence the relationship between counterterrorism pressures and civilian harm. Such comparative and multi-method approaches will deepen our understanding of sustainable security in asymmetric conflict environments.

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