The original language of this article is English and it was published in the 91st issue of a5 defense magazine.
Sahin, A.B. (2026) The Peace Process and Security Guarantees in the Russia Ukraine War: Political, Military and Economic Cost. A5 Defence Magazine pp.51-59.
To read the original: https://a5dergi.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/A5_Defence_91.pdf
Introduction
As of February 25, 2026, diplomatic negotiations aimed at ending the Russia-Ukraine war, which has completed its fourth year, have not shown sufficient diplomatic influence to ensure a lasting peace environment. Strategic conflicts of interest and territorial disputes of the states parties cause a continuous blockage in the peace negotiations signed as a result of the negotiations carried out since 2014. Minsk I and Minsk II agreements, the Belarus and Istanbul Talks included articles such as the cessation of active conflicts in the Ukrainian region, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the granting of special status to the Donbass, but did not go beyond the violated ceasefire and the ongoing war. Following the Istanbul talks, the agreement process was blocked even though a draft agreement containing Ukraine's commitment to an impartial, nonaligned status was signed.
In the peace negotiations held in Abu Dhabi on 24-25 January and 4-5 February 2026, Ukrainian, Russian and US delegations came together; After the second round of negotiations, Russia and Ukraine exchanged 157 by 157 prisoners of war. The continuation of Russia's military operations during the peace negotiations before the second round of negotiations brought concerns about the establishment of a permanent peace environment. In the face of repeated peace negotiations and violations in history, Russia's evaluations that it uses the negotiation process as a strategic tool to prevent Ukraine's NATO membership and save time on the ground have become more visible. The military activities, which continued simultaneously with Russian political discourse during the peace negotiations, strengthened the impression that a tactical approach was adopted rather than a permanent peace will. Within the scope of this study, the sustainability of the Russia-Ukraine war was discussed from a multidimensional perspective. In this direction, the economic and military cost of the war, the security guarantees demanded by the parties, the ongoing sovereignty and interest-based disputes on the Donetsk, Luhansk and Donbass lines, and the structural dynamics of the said regions that obstruct the peace process were analyzed. In addition, after the sanctions imposed on Russia, China and India
Peace Negotiations Security Guarantees
The two-day trilateral talks between Ukraine, the United States and Russia to end the war were held in Abu Dhabi on 23-24 January. US Special Representative for the Middle East Witkoff stated in his post that the US held productive and constructive meetings as part of its mediation efforts for a peaceful resolution of the Ukraine conflict in his meetings with Russian Special Envoy Kirill Dmitriev. Although the US has said that both sides are close to an agreement; according to Kieve, no agreement has yet been reached on the land issue, which is the key issue in the post-war solution. The most challenging topics at the Abu Dhabi negotiating table are expected to be territorial integrity, security guarantees and a permanent ceasefire.nbsp;
“Zelensky is trying to derail the peace process,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov publicly accused THE Ukrainian leadership after the assassination attempt on Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, a senior official of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), on February 6, following Abu Dhabi's second talks. The continuation of mutual military operations by states during peace negotiations is one of the other topics that escalate tension.
Ukrainian Defence Minister Umerov announced that the Ukrainian delegation is already in Geneva and is preparing for a new round of trilateral talks. In a post on social media, he expressed hope for constructive work and concise meetings on security and humanitarian issues, and progress towards a dignified and sustainable peace. On February 17-18, 2026, US, Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Geneva and raised territorial disputes. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on 16 February 2026, “The aim this time is to discuss a wider range of topics, including the main ones. The main issues concern both the land and everything related to the demands we put forward.
Even on the eve of the trilateral talks in Geneva, the Russian military has no orders other than to continue its attacks on Ukraine, Zelensky said. He said this shows how Russia views the diplomatic efforts of its partners. Ukraine and Russia completed the second day of talks in Geneva under the auspices of the United States on Wednesday without any significant progress. Although there are constructive negotiations in the military sense in Geneva, he pointed out that disagreements continue in the political field. Following the end of the talks, Kremlin negotiator Vladimir Medinsky held a closed-door meeting with the Ukrainian side, which lasted for about an hour and a half. No details of this interview have been revealed.
1.1. Land Disputes:
Ukraine's president Zelensky said trilateral talks between Russia, the US and Ukraine in Abu Dhabi would largely focus on the future of the Donbass region in the east of the country. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the eastern Donbass region remains an “important condition” for Russia. Yuri Uşakov, Putin's foreign policy adviser, stated that he participated in the meetings with Witkoff and Kushner and stated that "it was reaffirmed that a long-term reconciliation would not be possible without resolving the territorial issue". Under the plan, called the “Anchor Formula,” Moscow expects Ukraine to hand over all of Donbass to Russia, including areas that Russia has failed to capture. On the other hand, although Zelensky said that he was ready to evaluate the idea of a free economic zone offered by the USA, that is, the establishment of a special economic zone in Eastern Ukraine, the scenario of economic revival and peace process in the war zone, Moscow clearly stated that this was not enough. According to Zelensky, he pointed out that democratic processes such as security guarantees and public approval should be operated before such a region is established.
The peace talks that failed after the invasion of Ukraine, the largest military operation that Europe has seen since World War II, weaken the belief in ensuring stability in the region. One of the constant bottlenecks in peace negotiations is the disagreements between states on territorial and border security. As a matter of fact, Russia's stipulation that Ukraine should renounce its NATO membership and recognize the annexation of Donbass, Luhansk Zaporizhzhzhia, Kherson and Crimea; and Ukraine's demand for the complete withdrawal of the Russian army from Donbass, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, Kherson in order to protect its territorial integrity make reconciliation impossible. The reason for the conflict of interest in both states, especially in the Donbass, is that the Donbass has large underground mineral deposits worth up to $11.5 trillion, which are important for various industries from defense to electric vehicles, including rare earth elements such as coal, mining, lithium, cobalt, titanium and gallium. In the following infographic study, a detailed study was carried out on the reserves of other regions, especially Donbass and Zaporizhzhzhia, and the current control of these reserve resources.
In line with the above data, the Dnieper-Donetsk region of Ukraine alone accounts for 80% of the known traditional oil, gas and coal production and reserves. Ukrainian officials stated that their country is in the top 10 in the world in terms of titanium reserves used in missiles, aircraft and ships, but only about 10 percent of their proven reserves can be developed. The fact that these regions have rich reserves and that Putin will not give up the reserves he currently holds in war conditions took place in Alaska. Putin voiced full control over the Donbass at the Alaska Summit as the basic condition for the end of the war. According to estimates by the Reuters news agency, although Ukraine occupies about 5,000 square kilometers in Donetsk in 2026, all of Luhansk and about 70 percent of Donetsk are under Russian control by 2026. So about 88percent of Donbass is controlled by Russia. In the event that the Donbass region is completely under Russian control and the front line in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson is "frozen", Russia, which has direct access to Crimea thanks to the land corridor to be established, will both expand its borders and prevent Ukraine from entering the Sea of Azov, turning Azov into a Russian Lake on the maritime border;
1.2. Breaches of Agreement: In 2014, representatives of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and two separatist regions met in Minsk, the capital of Belarus, in order to end the conflicts between Russian-backed separatist forces and Ukrainian-affiliated military units in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine, in the 12-article Minsk protocol;
Immediate declaration of ceasefire
Armed groups in Ukraine military equipment, withdrawal of fighters and mercenaries
Observation and supervision of the ceasefire by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
Transfer of administrative powers to rebel-held areas in Donetsk and Luhansk
Observation of the Ukraine-Russia border by the OSCE and establishment of buffer security zones at the border
Maintaining “inclusive national dialogue”
Call for early local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk
Violations by both parties have damaged the relationship of trust between the parties. Ukraine has argued that Russia is only using these deals to buy timer. Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has violated at least 12 international and bilateral agreements. These include the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, which guarantee the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states, the inviolability of borders, the avoidance of the threat or use of force, and the freedom of states to choose or change their own security arrangements. There have been various peace initiatives outside of Minsk to end the conflict in the Ukrainian region and ensure a permanent ceasefire. One of them is the Istanbul Agreements, and the other is the Abu Dhabi and Geneva negotiations on the agenda. Istanbul talks were held in three rounds: 16 May, 2 June and 23 July 2025. During the negotiations, the parties reached agreement on a number of humanitarian issues, including the largest prisoner exchange since the start of the Second World War, and mutually submitted draft memoranda of understanding. However, no basic agreement could be reached on possible conflict resolution methods. In November 2025, the United States presented to Kiev and Moscow Trump's 28-point peace plan to resolve the conflict in Ukraine. According to Western media reports, the plan includes Ukraine's refusal to join NATO, as well as Washington's
1.3. Foreign Aids:
The military aid of the EU and NATO countries to Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia directly affected the course of the war and led to a change in the strategic balances of the war. In the first years of the war, Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, who evaluated the EU's supply of weapons to Ukraine in 2023, pointed out that Ukraine is increasingly demanding weapons; “The West encourages these demands of Ukraine, swearing that it is ready to provide these weapons. The situation got pretty deadlocked. This leads to an escalation of tensions, with Nato countries increasingly directly involved in the conflict. This cannot and will not potentially change the course of events. The special military operation will continue. ” peskov's rhetoric has not remained rhetorical; as of 2023, Russia's military operations against Ukraine have been continuous and directed towards critical civilian and strategic goals such as energy infrastructure, health facilities and airports. However, the airstrike on August 28, 2025, which caused damage to more than 90 buildings, including the offices of the EU Delegation and the British Council, can be considered as a symbolic and strategic power projection for the institutional and diplomatic presence of European actors in Ukraine, unlike previous infrastructure-oriented attacks.
The extent of international support for Ukraine varies according to the dataset and calculation methods used. According to the Germany-based think tank Kiel Institute, the United States pledged a total of $130.6 billion in support between January 24, 2022 and August 31, 2025. The US government stated that the total resource allocated to Ukraine reached 187 billion dollars. Zelensky stated that 40 billion dollars of the figure spent for his army was provided from equity resources, 35 billion dollars from the USA and 25 billion dollars from the EU (Crimean News Agency, 2025). EU countries froze Russia's 210 billion euros of assets and agreed on 90 billion euros of joint borrowing for Ukraine's 2026-2027 financing needs (Bayer, Gray, Rink, 2025).
Avrupa Birliği’nin Ukrayna’ya yönelik desteği mali ve askeri yardımla sınırlı kalmamış; Rusya’ya yönelik çeşitli yaptırımlar uygulanmıştır. İşgalin başlangıcından bu yana Rusya’ya yönelik ekonomik yaptırımların sürdüğünü hatırlatan Von der Leyen, 20. yaptırım paketini 'çok yakında' sunacaklarını açıkladı. Von der Leyen, bu hamlenin amacını 'Rusya’yı gerçek bir barış niyetiyle müzakere masasına oturmaya zorlamak için baskıyı artırmak' olarak ifade etmiştir. Tüm bu askeri ve ekonomik baskılar altında Putin, askeri varlığını sürdürebilmek için askerlik ikramiyelerini 195 bin rubleden 400 bin rubleye çıkarmak zorunda kalmıştır ki bu rakam It corresponds to almost five times the average monthly wage in Russia (Taşlı, 2025) Another move that will affect the course of the war is the recruitment of military personnel and the current losses. According to the Institute for War Research (ISW), in 2025 Russian forces operated on an area of about 4,900 square kilometers, which means at least 83 casualties per square kilometer. The deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence stated that Russia exceeded its recruitment targets and confirmed Moscow's claim that it would recruit more than 440,000 soldiers in 2024. In order to meet the need for routine military personnel, it made it a legal obligation for all healthy men to receive equivalent training during military service or higher education for one year from the age of 18. According to the document published in the official legal legislation portal, 261 thousand Russian citizens between the ages of 18 and 30, who are not in the status of reserve officers and who have military obligations, are expected to be recruited from January 1 to December 31, 2026. Although Russia hides official military casualties, independent sources, UK Defence Intelligence and NATO intelligence data have reported that the number of men with disabilities aged 31-59 increased by 30% (about 507,000 people) between 2022 and 2023, bringing the number of Russians in need of wheelchair or lower limb prostheses to 466,000.
2. Enhancing Ukraine's Combat Capability
Following Russia's airstrikes on Ukraine during the Abu Dhabi talks, on this development, NATO Secretary General Rutte drew attention to the critical importance of the 'Ukraine's Priority Needs List' (PURL) program implemented last summer. The PURL program is an initiative launched by the US and NATO to supply Ukraine with critical weapons. This initiative aims to finance the delivery of US-made weapons and equipment through NATO member states. The programme aims to enable partner countries to finance the supply of such weapons according to the list of priority needs defined by Ukraine and agreed with the US and NATO.
In the infographic study below, Ukraine's Priority Needs List (PURL) participating countries and their finances are visualized in detail.
At its December 2025 meeting, NATO's Foreign Ministry announced three new PURL packages, each valued at $500 million. One of the packages was funded by Germany, Norway and Poland, while the second package was funded by Germany, the Netherlands and Norway. The third PURL package was financed by Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. In addition to military equipment aid, military training supports have been provided to Ukraine since the beginning of the war. In October 2022, it was announced that more than 60,000 Ukrainian soldiers received training on the territory of the European Union within the scope of EUMAM Ukraine. Within the framework of the Operation Interflex program launched by the United Kingdom in July 2022, it provided basic combat training to more than 45,000 Ukrainian soldiers from the end of 2022 to the beginning of 2025. Since 2022, the United States has provided combined weapons maneuver, artillery coordination and air defense systems training to Ukrainian troops at bases in Europe, especially at the Grafenwöhr Training Field in Germany. At the same time, the F-16 Training Coalition, which was formed in 2023 under the leadership of Denmark and the Netherlands, started the training of Ukrainian pilots at the F-16 Training Center in Romania; the training of the first pilot group was completed in 2024.
NATO Secretary General Rutte emphasized that Ukraine's air defense capacity is largely based on NATO support, stressing that 75% of Patriot missiles and 90%of the ammunition required for other defense systems are provided through this program. For the attack carried out by Rutte Russia, especially in the peace process; “One of the most violent attacks against Ukraine was carried out in terms of the number of missiles and the number of ballistic missiles. It could be the worst attack ever, or at least between the first two or three attacks. Maybe the worst.” rutte said that immediately after the signing of the peace agreement with Russia, the armed forces of the “Coalition of Bidders” would be deployed on land, sea and air in Ukraine, while other NATO members would “help in other ways”.
3: Sanctions
The deterrent capacity of sanctions is a controversial issue in the literature. As in the case of Russia, such economic pressure tools can sometimes create a 'backfire effect', paving the way for the target country's foreign policy stance to proceed in an even harsher political course. It is possible to say that the 19th sanctions packages applied to Russia have a noticeable slowdown effect on the Russian economy. According to the International Energy Agency, Russia's oil revenues fell by more than a quarter in January 2023 (compared to January 2022). Despite the extensive sanctions imposed, the Russian economy has managed to maintain a certain level of stability thanks to energy revenues and military-industrial production growth.
In Chart 1 below, the IMF, World Bank and OECD figures are given in detail the effect of the 19 sanction packages applied to Russia on Russia's GDP.
As can be seen in the infographic study above, the Russian economy experienced a significant contraction in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and showed a strong recovery in 2021. In the post-2022 period, the growth momentum weakened due to the Ukrainian War and sanctions; 2023 estimates differed between institutions, but the OECD pointed to a more significant economic contraction. According to Clark (2026), US President Joe Biden stated in March 2022 that the Russian economy would shrink rapidly due to sanctions and would rank among the 20 largest economies in the world. However, this prediction has not been realized. Increased military expenditures after the sanctions shock in 2022 have compensated for the economic contraction; Russia has risen to the position of the world's ninth largest economy by 2025. Another view is that Larsen (2024) argues that the widespread expectations that the sanctions imposed under the leadership of the US and the European Union (EU) will create serious structural vulnerabilities in the Russian economy have not been realized. As a matter of fact, the Russian economy grew by 3.6% in 2023 and was among the fastest growing major economies outside India and China. In addition, the growth rates of 5.4% and 4.1% in the first two quarters of 2024, respectively, show that this acceleration in economic performance continues. The OECD recently
Following the imposition of strict export controls in 2022, Russia has turned to alternative supply chains that circumvent sanctions in order to supply products that are critical to its military industry. A significant part of the 50 critical items determined by the sanctions coalition within the scope of the "Common High Priority Products List" (CHPL) were supplied from the EU before the war. However, as of 2023, 90% of these imports were made through Chinese-related companies, and 49%were produced directly in China. Thus, China's role has evolved from intermediary to manufacturing; many sensitive products from CNC machines to ball bearings have started to be supplied from China instead of the West. Russia's isolation in foreign policy has paved the way for joint military exercises and cooperation to deepen relations with China. DW pointed out that Turkey is one of the saviors of the Russian economy and stated that "Some countries that do not impose sanctions on Russia, especially China, such as Turkey and Kazakhstan, have significantly increased their trade with Moscow". In the economic picture, the economic costs of Western sanctions: Russia remains the most sanctioned country in the world in 2025, according to Forbes. More than 20,000 sanctions have been imposed by 50 countries, more than 80% of them in February 2022
4. Costs of War
The human cost of war has reached devastating proportions. Although it has been officially stated that the number of civilian deaths since the beginning of the occupation is 13 thousand 580,the actual figure is estimated to be much higher. While the US Department of Defense estimated the civilian loss of life at around 40,000, it was noted that 3.7 million people were displaced domestically and 6.9 million people were living as refugees abroad as of 2025. Although estimates of the number of Russian soldiers killed, wounded or missing vary, the most recent estimates show that there were 700,000 or more casualties, with a daily casualty rate of 670. This figure reflects the losses sustained by the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) during a similar conflict, the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. 50% less than the lowest estimate.
Department of Defense From 600.000 excessively dead or injured (October 2024 estimate).
International Number of Injuries (IISS): 783 of which 172,000 are dead and 611,000 wounded (end-2024 estimate).
NYT: From 700.000 excessively dead or injured (January 2025 estimate).
Republic.ru: 1,200,000 , of which 300,000 are dead and 900,000 wounded (February 2025 estimate).
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: 48,000 loss (December 2024 estimate). (Trevelyan, 2024).
Savaşın maliyetleri yalnızca askeri teçhizat, personel ve sivil kayıplarla sınırlı kalmamakta; uzun soluklu çatışma hali devletlerin ekonomisini de önemli ölçüde yavaşlatabilir. Çatışma bölgesinde üstünlüğün sağlanılması için askeri personelin eğitilmesi, savaş bütçesine aktarılan kaynaklar, ek ödenekler, uluslararası alanda maruz kalınan yaptırımlar; kayıplar için ödenen aylıklar, sakat kalan askerlerin sağlık masrafları vb. gelişmeler savaş halindeki devletler için bir külfet oluşturmaktadır. Ekonomik etkiler dışında sosyolojik ve toplumsal düzeyde de savaşın etkileri görülmektedir. Rusya'nın savaş öncesi popülasyonu 146-147 milyondu ve cinsiyet oranı %53,5'i kadın, %46,5'i erkekti; bu rakamlara göre Rusya'da kadınlar erkeklerden 10-11 milyon daha fazlasını oluşturuyor. 2026 yılında popülasyonun 143-146 milyon civarında olacağı tahmin ediliyor (savaş + göç + düşük doğum oranları nedeniyle hafif bir düşüş). Toplam nüfusun %53,65'i kadın, %46,35'i erkektir; kadınlar erkeklerden yaklaşık 10,5 milyon daha fazladır. Değişimin nedenleri: Savaş kayıpları (1,2-1,25 milyon kayıp, 219-325 bin ölü; Mediazona: 219 bin doğrulanmış, %99'u erkek) erkek nüfusunu yaklaşık %0,3-0,5 oranında azaltmıştır. Askerlikten kaçınma (500 bin-1 milyon genç erkek göçü) ek bir etki yaratmıştır, ama genelde bu etkinin boyutu küçüktür (~%0,3'lük bir değişim). Savaşın popülasyon üzerinde dramatik bir kırılma sayısal rakamlara yansımasa da; toplam erkek nüfusu 68-70 milyon olan; ölü sayısı 300 bin (etki %0,4). Popülasyondaki 10 milyonluk kadın fazlası (dünyanın en yüksek fazlası) bu değişimi absorbe etmektedir.
The losses in the war process in both states significantly affected the social balance. In addition, the severe damage to the infrastructure in regions where active conflicts are experienced makes the war and reconstruction process extremely difficult both technically and financially. Today, many cities where intensive operations are carried out in Ukraine have been largely destroyed. In the fourth year of the war, the military, economic and human losses of both sides reached serious levels. A permanent ceasefire and stability could not be achieved in the ongoing peace negotiations in Abu Dhabi and Geneva. In order to ensure a permanent ceasefire and establish stability in the peace process, the parties should establish assurance mechanisms that they will avoid the use of force mutually. Russia's demand for full sovereignty over the Donbas, Luhansk and Donetsk regions, especially the fact that both states frequently neglect this guarantee, and its determined attitude not to give up Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty rights, continue to constitute a fundamental deadlock in peace negotiations. These structural disagreements increase the risk that a possible ceasefire will remain temporary rather than long-term and sustainable, as in the previous Minsk I and Minsk II agreements and the Istanbul talks.
5. Putin's Discourses on Denazification in the Occupation Process and the Legitimation of War
Just after the beginning of the occupation, President Putin of Russia;
“For eight years, eight full years, we have done everything we can to resolve the situation through peaceful political means. Everything was in vain.
Again, Putin;
“As I mentioned in my previous speech, you can't look relentlessly at what's going on there. It has become intolerable. We had to stop this atrocity, this genocide that millions of people who lived there and whose hopes were tied to Russia, to all of us, and we have no plans to occupy Ukrainian lands. We do not intend to impose anything on anyone by force.
it has been reported that approximately 14 thousand civilians lost their lives in Ukraine today, except for casualties and military deaths. The 'denazification' argument used by Russia in the occupation process is a typical example of securitization. At this point, the Putin administration legitimizes the military intervention as a necessary defense mechanism against an existential threat by 'marginalizing' the Ukrainian identity. Putin actively used the claim that the Russian-speaking population, and especially the Russians in Ukraine, were suppressed by the so-called neo-Nazi protests and the “Nazi” government that came to power during the Euromaidan revolution (November 2013-2014), both during the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and later during the armed conflict in the Donbass region. Released by the US Consulate on Putin's Denazification rhetoric Disinformation Roulette: The Kremlin's Year of Lies to Justify an Unjust War noting in its report the Kremlin's claim that NATO and the “West” are aggressors that threaten Russia's security in order to justify the war; That the West has turned its narrative of disinformation fueling the war into a narrative that the US and NATO are prolonging or escalating the war by helping Ukraine defend itself 4 of the DR.
Another issue that increases the tension and discussions in the region in war crimes is the issue of children lost in the war. The Yale Center for Human Rights Research (HRL) has collected information on at least 6,000 Ukrainian children aged four months to 17 years who have been held in camps and other facilities since the total invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. At least 32 (78%) of the camps identified by the HRL are promoted as “integration programmes” with the goal of integrating Ukrainian children into systematic retraining efforts that expose them to Russia-based academic, cultural, patriotic and/or military training. The Yale Center for Human Rights Research (Yale HRL) identified at least two camps in Russia where allegedly orphaned children were housed and then placed in foster homes. He reported that twenty children from these camps were placed in families in the Moscow region and enrolled in local schools there. US Consulates in China in the same report
The Kremlin is committed to denying the existence of Ukraine as a state and its past and future is determined to delete ” russia claimed that these children had no parents or guardians to take care of them or that they could not be reached.
But the Associated Press found that authorities deported Ukrainian children to Russia or Russian-controlled areas without their consent, lied about being unwanted by their parents, used them for propaganda purposes, and gave them Russian families and citizenship. As a matter of fact, if we had the opportunity to access the age range information of the kidnapped children, we could make an assumption about whether they were raised to fight against their own country in the war zone with these indicators. However, the realities reflected differently in the Western and Russian media make it difficult to detect this situation, which cannot be ignored in war crimes.
Result
The Russia-Ukraine war, which has entered its fourth year, has gone beyond a classic regional conflict and turned into a power struggle that produces multi-layered, long-term and systemic effects. During the war, both sides suffered serious military losses, and civilian deaths and mass displacements deepened the humanitarian dimension. Various sanctions imposed to create deterrence during the war process have led to the reshaping of diplomatic relations on a global scale. The fact that the war lasted longer than expected, on the one hand, brought up the discussions of strategic failure due to Russia's failure to achieve rapid victory; on the other hand, it strengthened the discussions that Moscow was indirectly struggling with the Western alliance and therefore it was a long-lasting war. This clearly reveals the capacity of power asymmetries between direct and indirect actors to produce results in modern wars.
Savaş boyunca uygulanan kapsamlı yaptırımlara rağmen Rus ekonomisinin beklenen çöküşü yaşamaması, enerji gelirleri, alternatif ticaret ağları ve yaptırımlara uyum stratejileri sayesinde ekonomik dayanıklılığın belirli ölçüde koruduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Buna karşılık Ukrayna’nın başta Avrupa Birliği olmak üzere Batılı aktörlerden aldığı mali, askeri ve siyasi destek, modern müttefiklik ilişkilerinin savunma yatırımları ile sınırlı kalmamış aynı zamanda finansman, teknoloji transferi ve istihbarat paylaşımı boyutlarını da içeren; klasik ittifak modellerinin ötesinde, ağ temelli ve çok aktörlü bir güvenlik mimarisinin sahada test edildiği bir sürece dönüşmüştür.
The conflict also served as a laboratory where modern defense technologies were tested in real combat conditions. Unmanned aerial vehicles, precision-guided munitions, electronic warfare systems, and satellite-assisted intelligence elements have significantly changed the character of warfare. As Saradzhyan (2025) emphasizes, although Russia's military reputation has been partially damaged, the battlefield has been an important testing ground for modern combat experience and the application of new technologies. In this process, while the Russian Armed Forces were testing modern systems, the fact that the old generation main battle tanks such as the T-72, T-80 and T-90 could not show the expected performance in high-density modern warfare conditions clearly revealed the need for transformation in doctrine, tactics and force structure. In addition, Russia has made certain progress towards developing advanced electronic mixing capabilities and its own UAV platforms to offset Ukraine's dependence on UAVs. These experiences offer important implications for the capacity for tactical and technological adaptation in modern warfare conditions. In the diplomatic field, the continuous blocking of peace initiatives, the parties not giving up on their maximalist goals, and the simultaneous continuation of military operations in the field with negotiations, in cases where the conflict of interest is high, traditional
As a result, the Russia-Ukraine war is a critical breaking point that shapes the future of the international system in terms of great power competition, the effectiveness of economic sanctions, the transformation of modern military technologies, and the formation of new alliance models. The prolongation of the war shows that military victory alone is not enough to produce political results, and that economic resilience, external support networks and diplomatic maneuvering capacity are as decisive as military power in modern conflicts. For this reason, the war in question is a basic reference case in terms of understanding the hybrid, multidimensional and long-term conflict dynamics of the 21st century.
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