On 2 May 2024, Ankara officially announced the suspension of all forms of exports, imports, and transit trade with Israel across all product categories. The government repeatedly confirmed to the public that even air and maritime transportation involving vessels and aircraft flying the flags of the two countries had been suspended. This was not merely a symbolic gesture, but a decision that was formally implemented through the state bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, a parliamentary motion submitted to the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) in February 2026 introduced a set of data that complicated this official picture. Members of Parliament from the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) drew attention to the “Confidential Country” category in the foreign trade statistics of the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), claiming that this category corresponded to a trade volume of USD 2.1 billion in 2025. A more concrete data point comes from Israel’s own Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). According to its records, exports from Türkiye to Israel amounted to USD 924.1 million in 2025, while the figure had already reached USD 82.1 million in January 2026. In other words, exports recorded during the twenty-first month following the official decision to impose a “complete halt” have generated questions concerning both the publicly visible and less visible dimensions of Türkiye–Israel economic relations. The Ministry of Trade categorically rejected these claims, arguing that TÜİK data had been misinterpreted. The issue remains unresolved in the form of a parliamentary motion awaiting a ministerial response.

Regardless of which side is ultimately correct in this dispute, the discrepancy itself constitutes an important finding: the actual scale of the economic relationship between the two countries has become a partially opaque domain that does not fully correspond to the political rhetoric surrounding bilateral relations. This opacity contributes an interesting dimension to the classical international relations debate oneconomic interdependence. While political discourse between states may signal a complete rupture, fully severing underlying commercial and economic linkages whether through third countries, free-trade zones, or private-sector channels is considerably more difficult. Such resilience may also function as an invisible yet tangible constraint on the willingness of both sides to engage in direct military confrontation. The inability of a state that declares “zero relations” at the rhetorical level to achieve a complete economic rupture may therefore indicate the extent to which the two societies and their economies remain structurally interconnected.

The Real Competition: Shifting Positions in the Arms Market

Public discussions of “how powerful the Turkish military is” are generally framed as abstract comparisons of military strength. Yet the principal concern within Israeli strategic circles lies in a much more concrete and measurable domain: the shifting balance of positions in the global defense-industrial export market.

According to SIPRI’s 2026 report, Türkiye has risen to become the world’s11th-largest arms exporter, accounting for 1.8 percent of global arms exports. This share has doubled over the past five years. In the same report, Israel ranks seventh with a 4.4 percent share. Israel therefore remains ahead of Türkiye, but the gap is narrowing rapidly. One of the most striking examples behind this trend is Baykar. In 2025, the company generated USD 2.2 billion in exports, with 88 percent of its revenues derived from international sales, and maintained its position as the world’s leading exporter of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) for the third consecutive year. Turkish defense-industry exports increased from USD 200 million in 2000 to USD 10.5 billion in 2025, representing a52-fold increase over 25 years.

These figures indicate that Türkiye–Israel competition has evolved beyond the realm of regional security into direct competition for customers in third-country markets. The Middle East, Africa, and Asia-Pacific markets, where Türkiye’s exports of UAVs/UCAVs and armored vehicles have become increasingly concentrated, have traditionally also constituted priority markets for the Israeli defense industry. From this perspective, Israel may perceive Türkiye’s growing military-technical influence in Syria not merely as an issue of border security, but also as a potential showcase through which Türkiye could further consolidate the reputation of itsbattle-tested systems. In the defense industry, one of the factors that most strongly influences procurement decisions is the demonstrated performance of a system under real combat conditions. Accordingly, Israel’s efforts to constrain Türkiye’s presence in Syria may reflect, beyond conventional security concerns, a motivation to protect its own position in the global defense-export market.

Regional Diplomatic Alignment

A relatively underreported development following the Abu Zuhur attack was the joint statement issued by the foreign ministers of ten countries condemning the attack:Algeria, Indonesia, Palestine, Qatar, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritania, Pakistan, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia. Although this list may initially appear to be a minor detail, it is significant when examined through the lens of regional diplomatic alignment.

The inclusion of countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar both of which maintain close relations with Washington and have occupied different positions within the process of normalization with Israel suggests that Israel’s military freedom of action in Syria has generated unease even among states situated within its broader diplomatic normalization network. This may be interpreted as an indication that the regional legitimacy Israel has sought to construct in the post-Abraham Accords period is beginning to face strains as a result of its actions in Syria. Rather than primarily indicating a risk of diplomatic isolation for Ankara, this may point to the fragility of Israel’s own regional alliance architecture, a dimension that has received comparatively limited attention.

When these three datasets (i) the trajectory of trade that does not fully correspond with official political rhetoric, (ii) direct competition in the defense-industrial market, and (iii) regional diplomatic reactions that extend even into Israel’s own alliance network—are considered together, a layer emerges that is often absent from conventional crisis analyses. The rhetorical dimension of Türkiye–Israel tensions is considerably sharper than the underlying structural relationships in the economic, commercial, and industrial spheres. This discrepancy can be interpreted in two opposing ways.

The first is an optimistic interpretation.The fact that economic and commercial ties have not been completely severed may indicate that a certain degree of“capacity for reversal”still exists between the two countries. In other words, the intensity of political rhetoric may suggest that neither side possesses a genuine intention to engage in direct conflict, and that the rhetoric functions primarily as political signaling toward domestic and regional audiences.

The second is a pessimistic interpretation.The direct competition revealed by defense-industry data may continue according to its own logic, independently of political rhetoric, and could eventually begin to shape the political relationship itself. Since the loss of market share translates into reputational and financial losses for a state, this is not an area that can be managed solely through diplomatic gestures.

Which interpretation ultimately prevails will depend to a considerable extent on the outcome of Israel’s October 2026 electoral process and the speed with which the authorities in Damascus consolidate their position. What can be said at present, however, is that this rivalry is continuing quietly not only through air bases and military delegations, but also through customs statistics and export markets. Although this second front has been discussed in certain public debates, its broader implications have yet to receive sufficient attention.

Accordingly, under contemporary conditions of warfare, decisive factors extend beyond our traditional understanding of warfare to includeeconomic structures and global interdependencies. Although Israel is currently constructing a discourse of threat toward Türkiye, translating these threats into military power on the ground would impose significant economic and military costs on both states. In particular, the newly established Türkiye–Pakistan–Saudi Arabia alignment following the recent Mecca Agreement appears to introduce another dimension to the equation, as the provisions reportedly emphasize collective action in the event that any one of the countries is attacked. This suggests that the existing tension could potentially evolve into a broader strategic dynamic.

Military Power and the Limits of Conventional Comparisons

Although Israel’s attempts to test its power in Syria appear to be driven, at least in part, by a strategy aimed at provoking Türkiye, Ankara has not responded to the rhetoric and aggressive policies constructed by Israel through direct military action. Debates over which country would prevail in a direct confrontation are often framed in terms of weapons inventories and military capabilities. Yet such an approach is insufficient on its own. Possessing advanced weapons and substantial military capabilities is not, by itself, enough to guarantee superiority in a direct confrontation.

The wars in Ukraine and the ongoing conflicts involving Iran provide examples of this limitation. Therefore, the potential course of a conflict must be analyzed through the interaction ofgeographical conditions, strategic planning, and military strategiesrather than through military inventories alone.

The infographic below provides a comparative assessment of the military and defense capabilities of Türkiye and Israel.

The available data concerning the active military strength of the two states vary considerably. In particular, information that is not disclosed to the public for security reasons makes it difficult to conduct a fully symmetrical comparison of the military capabilities of the two countries. Nevertheless, the primary objective of this infographic is to provide a general framework for assessing the current military capabilities of the two states.

The reason for incorporating Israel’stotal populationinto this parameter is primarily related to the country’s system of military service. The concept of a“Nation in Arms”refers to a societal model in which Israeli citizens, irrespective of gender and with certain exceptions such as the Haredi population, are subject to military service obligations, while military training is structured not merely as a period of active service but as a continuously sustainable capacity extending throughout an individual’s life. Consequently, assessing Israel’s military capacity solely on the basis of active-duty personnel risks overlooking the country’s broadermobilization and reserve-force capacity.

At the same time, when comparing the defense inventories of the two states, focusing solely on the number of platforms possessed is insufficient. The production and maintenance of every air, land, and naval platform, the preservation of operational readiness, maintenance and sustainment requirements, fuel consumption, as well as the procurement of ammunition and spare parts, all generate significant costs. Therefore, one of the truly decisive dimensions of military capacity is not simply the quantity of platforms possessed, butthe extent to which that capacity can be sustained and at what operational intensity.

In other words, the ability to deploy an aircraft is only one component of military capability. Equally important is the ability to sustain the necessary supply of fuel and ammunition throughout an operation and to ensure that expended or lost munitions can be replaced at sufficient scale and speed. From this perspective, initiating a war should not, by itself, be regarded as an indicator of military power. The decisive factor is the extent to which the multidimensional military, economic, logistical, and political costs generated by a conflict can be sustained over time.

For this reason, despite Türkiye’s increasingly assertive rhetoric in recent periods, I do not believe that its decision-making processes will necessarily be shaped solely at the rhetorical level or that Türkiye will adopt a policy favoring direct military confrontation.

Bilateral relations between the two countries, shifting power balances and regional influence in Syria, and competition in the defense market are bringing Türkiye and Israel into confrontation in certain areas. Nevertheless, under current conditions, a direct and active military confrontation between the two states would entail substantial costs and risks. Consequently, it appears more likely that the parties will sustain their rivalry throughdiplomatic, economic, and indirect instruments of powerrather than through direct military confrontation.

That said, if Israel’s activities in Syria were to reach a level that directly threatened Türkiye’s core security interests, or if actions directly targeting Turkish military personnel were to occur, Ankara could reconsider its current position and place the option of a military response back on the policy agenda. Thus, while a direct military confrontation appears unlikely under present circumstances, the activities of both parties in the Syrian theater and the degree to which they approach each other’s red lines will remain among the key factors determining the future trajectory of the risk of conflict.